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Abstract. Formal verification provides strong safety guarantees but only for
models of cyber-physical systems. Hybrid system models describe the required
interplay of computation and physical dynamics, which is crucial to guarantee
what computations lead to safe physical behavior (e.g., cars should not collide).
Control computations that affect physical dynamics must act in advance to avoid
possibly unsafe future circumstances. Formal verification then ensures that the
controllers correctly identify and provably avoid unsafe future situations under a
certain model of physics. But any model of physics necessarily deviates from re-
ality and, moreover, any observation with real sensors and manipulation with real
actuators is subject to uncertainty. This makes runtime validation a crucial step to
monitor whether the model assumptions hold for the real system implementation.
The key question is what property needs to be runtime-monitored and what a
satisfied runtime monitor entails about the safety of the system: the observa-
tions of a runtime monitor only relate back to the safety of the system if they
are themselves accompanied by a proof of correctness! For an unbroken chain
of correctness guarantees, we, thus, synthesize runtime monitors in a provably
correct way from provably safe hybrid system models. This paper addresses the
inevitable challenge of making the synthesized monitoring conditions robust to
partial observability of sensor uncertainty and partial controllability due to actu-
ator disturbance. We show that the monitoring conditions result in provable safety
guarantees with fallback controllers that react to monitor violation at runtime.
1 Introduction
Correctness arguments for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) crucially depend on models
in order to enable predictions about their future behavior. Absent any models, neither
tests nor verification provide any correctness results except for the limited amount of
concrete (test) cases, because they cannot provide predictions for other cases. Models
of physics are crucial in CPSs, but necessarily deviate from reality. Even cyber com-
ponents may come with surprises when their detailed implementation is more complex
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[car]¬collision
〈car〉collision
(e. g., d<1ft at v>5mph)
collision
(a) A proof of [car]¬collision shows
that all runs are safe, which in partic-
ular means the model car avoids paths
to collision (〈car〉collision)
collision
car
X
car
X
a
〈a〉collision possible
b
[b]¬collision guaranteed
a ∪ b
monitor: a is like car E
monitor: b is like carX
(b) Monitors detect when a real system is about
to enter paths to the unsafe states
Fig. 1: Logical characterization of safety and monitors
than their verification model. Linking cyber and physical components with sensors and
actuators adds another layer of uncertainty. These discrepancies are inevitable and call
into question how safety analysis results about models can ever transfer to CPS imple-
mentations. Not using models, however, would invalidate all predictions [32].
Even though rigorous correct-by-construction approaches promise provably correct
implementation of the software portion of the model, their correctness is still predi-
cated on meeting the assumptions of the model about the physical environment and the
physical effects of actuators.1 Whether or not these environment and actuator effects
are faithfully represented in the model can only be checked from actual measurements
[27] during system operation at runtime.
The key question, however, is what property needs to be runtime-monitored on sen-
sor measurements and what a satisfied monitor implies about the safety of the system
in terms of the possible true values. There is a fundamental asymmetry of the power
of runtime monitoring in CPS compared to purely discrete software systems. In pure
software it may suffice to monitor the critical property itself and suspend the software
upon violation, raising an exception to propagate the violation to surrounding code for
mitigation. In cyber-physical systems, any such attempt would be fundamentally flawed,
because there is no way of reverting time and trying something else!
A desired property of a self-driving car is to be collision-free (stay outside the red
region in Fig. 1a), which, e. g., might be expressed as always keeping at least 1ft dis-
tance to other cars. Even though this property states a good high-level goal, monitoring
whether it will be maintained requires checking membership in a much smaller region
that makes it possible to predict that all future behavior also respects the property, not
just the present state (where a collision may be inevitable on violation). In our approach,
– offline safety proofs ensure that a controller avoids all safety violations with respect
to an explicit model of physics, sensor uncertainty, and actuator disturbance (see
green region in Fig. 1a, formula [car]¬collision says that all runs of the car model
avoid collision)—this reduces system correctness to the validation question “did
we build the right model?”,
1 Some implementations deliberately choose to implement the model in a liberal way to interact
with unverified components (e. g., use machine learning), or to allow for adaptation at runtime.
These implementations require monitoring of the implementation for compliance with its model.
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– formal characterizations of monitor conditions unambiguously and provably cor-
rectly describe how to validate a model at runtime and detect discrepancies between
the model and the true system from sensor measurements,
– offline synthesis proofs turn formal monitor characterizations into runtime monitors
that act in advance based on sensor measurements with provable safety guarantees
about the true CPS (see Fig. 1b: monitor X means the system behaves like the
model car and so we know ¬collision is true in that state from the safety proof; if
a monitor determines that a runtime behavior a deviates from the model car then
we cannot conclude [a]¬collision, so 〈a〉collision is possible and fallback control
engaged in a Simplex-style architecture [38,2]), and
– correctness theorems justify that all future model behavior will be safe if the mon-
itor is satisfied at runtime (see Fig. 1b: monitor determines that runtime behavior b
is like the model car whose future behavior is guaranteed collision-free from the
safety proof [car]¬collision), and recoverability theorems establish the effective-
ness of fallback control on monitor violation.
These proofs, formal characterizations, and theorems simultaneously justify model
correctness and system safety through a verified link between offline verification and
runtime monitoring, and ensure that no assumption is missed that needs to be checked
for system correctness. Such a provably safe monitoring approach crucially requires
models of discrete and continuous dynamics and logical foundations for analyzing both
necessity [α]safe and possibility 〈α〉¬safe in the same framework, which is why we
chose differential dynamic logic [31,30]. For example, the specification “keep at least
1ft distance to other cars” in our approach considers the dynamics and results in a
monitor “always keep stopping distance at least as a specific function of velocity etc.”
that acts ahead of time as opposed to after a collision is already inevitable. Verified
machine code of runtime monitors could be obtained with VeriPhy [4].
Based on ModelPlex [27], this paper addresses the fundamental challenge how such
an approach can systematically handle the inevitable complications of sensor uncer-
tainty and actuator disturbance in partially observable hybrid systems. What makes
monitoring fundamentally more complex in partial observability cases is that the very
state variables that are responsible for the accuracy of the model cannot be measured!
The monitor, thus, needs to settle for drawing indirect conclusions about the unobserv-
able state from observations about the evolution of other state variables over time.
2 Preliminaries: Differential Dynamic Logic by Example
This section recalls differential dynamic logic dL [31,30], which we use to syntactically
characterize the semantic conditions required for correctness of the ModelPlex runtime
monitoring approach. We exploit the proof calculus of dL [31,30] to guarantee correct-
ness of the monitors produced for concrete CPS models. This section also introduces
our running example of a simple flight collision avoidance protocol.
Syntax summary. Differential dynamic logic uses hybrid programs as a notation for
hybrid systems (Table 1). The set of dL formulas is generated by the following grammar
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(∼ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} and θ1, θ2 are arithmetic expressions in +,−, ·, / over the reals):
φ ::= θ1 ∼ θ2 | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | ∀xφ | ∃xφ | [α]φ | 〈α〉φ
dL allows us to make statements that we want to be true for all runs of a hybrid
program ([α]φ) or for at least one run (〈α〉φ). Both constructs are necessary to derive
safe monitors. We need proofs of [α]φ so that we can be sure all behavior of a model
are safe. We need proofs of 〈α〉φ to identify when a system execution can fit to the
verified model. We use dL’s verification technique to prove such correctness properties
of hybrid programs [31,30] as implemented in the KeYmaera X prover [14] .
Example: Horizontal flight collision avoidance. We model a simple horizontal collision
avoidance protocol for two constant-speed airplanes [39,15]: our controlled ownship
takes angular velocity w as pilot commands and can fly straight (w := 0) or enter a
circular wait pattern (w := 1) to avoid collision with a straight-path intruder airplane.
θ
vo
vi
y
x
The linear and angular velocities of ownship and intruder
are independently controlled, but for position and orientation
we use a reference frame relative to the ownship centered at
(0, 0, 0) while the intruder is at (x, y, θ). The ownship moves
with constant linear velocity vo and pilot-controlled angular
velocityw along a straight line or circle, the intruder with con-
stant linear velocity vi on a straight path.
flight ≡ (ctrl; plant)∗ (1)
ctrl ≡ (w := 0; ?I) ∪ (w := 1; ?J (w)) (2)
I ≡ vi sin θx− (vi cos θ − vo)y > vo + vi (3)
J (w) ≡ viw sin θx− viw cos θy + vovi cos θ > vovi + viw (4)
plant ≡ {x′ = vi cos θ − vo + wy, y′ = vi sin θ − wx, θ′ = −w} (5)
The HP flight describes the pilot and collision avoidance controller ctrl of the ownship
and flight dynamics plant of both airplanes. Controller and flight dynamics are repeated
nondeterministically often, indicated by ∗ in (1). The pilot has two control choices: The
pilot may choose a straight path w := 0 if ?I indicates that it is safe, or a circular
Table 1: Hybrid program (HP) representations of hybrid systems
Statement Effect
α;β sequential composition, first run hybrid program α, then hybrid program β
α ∪ β nondeterministic choice, following either hybrid program α or β
α∗ nondeterministic repetition, repeats n ≥ 0 times hybrid program α
x := θ assign value of term θ to variable x (discrete jump)
x := ∗ assign arbitrary real number to variable x
?F check that formula F holds in current state, and abort if it does not(
x′1 = θ1, . . . , evolve xi along differential equation system x′i = θi
x′n = θn & F
)
for any duration within evolution domain F
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evasion maneuver w := 1 if allowed by ?J (w) in (2). The flight dynamics (5) keep the
(moving) ownship at the origin by combining both ownship and intruder motion in the
relative position (x, y); the differential equation θ′ = −w rotates the reference frame.
Formula (6) specifies safety of the flight protocol flight: all runs that start in states
satisfying the assumptions A must stay in states satisfying the safety condition S.
vo = 1 ∧ vi = 1 ∧ x2 + y2 > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
assumptions A
→ [flight]x2 + y2 > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
safety S
(6)
Semantics. The semantics of dL [30,29] is a Kripke semantics in which the states of the
Kripke model are the states of the hybrid system, which are maps ω : V → R assigning
a real value ω(x) to each variable x ∈ V . We write ωrx for the state ω˜ that equals ω
except that ω˜(x) = r. We write ω ∈ [[φ]] if formula φ is true in state ω. The semantics
of a hybrid program α is a relation [[α]] between initial and final states. For example
ω ∈ [[[α]φ]] iff ν ∈ [[φ]] for all (ω, ν) ∈ [[α]], so all runs of α from ω are safe.
We use the following notation to refer to variables of hybrid programs and dL for-
mulas [30]: FV(α) and FV(φ) are the free variables, BV(α) and BV(φ) are the bound
variables of a program or formula, respectively, and the complement is BV(α){. We use
V(α) = FV(α) ∪ BV(α) to denote the set of all variables of α.
Notation. To concisely handle intervals that we will need for tolerances in partially
observable hybrid systems, we use shortcut notation. We use x∈B[l,u](y) to say that x is
in the interval [l, u] around y (so y+l ≤ x ≤ y+u) and x∈B∆(y) to say x∈B[−∆,∆](y).
We use x:∈B∆(y) to refer to a program that nondeterministically picks any value from
the interval [y − ∆, y + ∆] for x, which is the hybrid program x := ∗; ?y − ∆ ≤
x ∧ x ≤ y + ∆. The notation x:∈α is synonymous with α but emphasizes that the
vector of variables x are the only BV(α). In monitors, we use x to denote the vector
of present state variables and x+ for the vector of variables in the next state. We use
x′=f(x, u)@ε to refer to an ODE that runs for time ε, which is the hybrid program t :=
0; {x′=f(x, u), t′ = 1 & t ≤ ε}; ?t=ε. We abbreviate ODEs to the interpolated plant
effect z−z0 where z means ν(x) and z0 means ω(x) for (ω, ν) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)@ε]].
3 Framework: Monitor Synthesis for Verified Runtime Validation
CPS are almost impossible to get right without rigorous safety analysis, for instance by
formal verification. Performed offline, these approaches result in a verified model of a
CPS, i. e. formula (7) is proved valid, for example using the differential dynamic logic
proof calculus [30] implemented in KeYmaera X [14]:
A→ [α∗]S (7)
The model α∗ is a hybrid program as in Section 2, and so it describes the discrete
control actions of the controllers in the system as well as the continuous physics of the
plant and the system’s environment. A formula J is an inductive invariant of program
α for (7) if A→ J and J → [α]J and J → S are valid.
Whether or not the control choices, actuator and environment effects are faithfully
represented in the model can only be checked from measurements [27]. Intuitively, such
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checks compare the values of variables x in state νi−1 to the values in state νi (stored
in x+) taken at successive sample times to check compatibility of the unknown system
behavior γi−1 with model α∗ (Fig. 2).
νi−1 νi
γi−2
⊆ α∗
γi−1
?⊆ α∗
Model monitor: measurements and
control decisions agree with model?
Fig. 2: System transition γi checked for
validation against model transition α∗.
For example, measurements x=2 and
x+=3 are compatible with the repeated
differential equation (x′=x2 + x)∗, because
starting at x can produce x+, as witnessed by
a proof of the dL formula x=2 ∧ x+=3 →
〈(x′=x2 + x)∗〉(x+=x). No x+ < x is com-
patible with the program, since the program
can reach only states where x+ ≥ x.
ModelPlex [27] provides the basis for ob-
taining such runtime checks from hybrid system models both automatically and in a
provably correct manner (Appendix B shows a basic example how a ModelPlex proof
synthesizes runtime checks). ModelPlex simplifies analysis in a verified manner to the
loop body α of a hybrid program α∗, starting from monitor conditions in dL of the form
〈α〉Υ+, where Υ+ is shortcut notation for x+ = x for all x ∈ BV(α) to collect the
effect of executing α (with a focus on preserving proof-relevant dynamics, not neces-
sarily the exact trajectories as in [37]). For a previous state ω and new state ν does the
satisfaction relation (ω, ν) |= φ hold iff monitor condition φ holds with its x values
coming from ω and x+ values from ν [27]:
Definition 1 (Transition satisfaction relation). The satisfaction relation (ω, ν) |= φ
of dL formula φ for a pair of states (ω, ν) evaluates φ in the state resulting from state
ω by interpreting variable x+ as ν(x) for all x ∈ V , i. e., (ω, ν) |= φ iff ων(x)x+ ∈ [[φ]].
Otherwise we write (ω, ν) 6|= φ.
The central correctness result about ModelPlex [27, Theorems 1 and 2] guarantees
that its resulting monitoring formula preserves safety, i. e., if the monitoring formula
is true with current sensor measurements and control choices, then the system is safe.
Here, we complement [27, Theorems 1 and 2] with recoverability guarantees provided
by fallback control per Def. 2 when the monitors are violated. Recoverability guarantees
are phrased in terms of the inductive invariant J used in the safety proof of A→ [α∗]S,
since J implies present safety (J → S) and is maintained in the future (J → [α]J).
Definition 2 (Fallback control). A fallback control is any hybrid program β such that
for all states ω,ν with (ω, ν) ∈ [[β]] we have (ω, ν) |= 〈u:∈ctrl(x)〉Υ+.
If the actions that led to monitor violation do not have permanent physical effect
(e. g., they can be discarded or undone instantaneously, such as wrong control decisions
before they are handed to actuators), then monitor violation is recoverable by fallback:
Theorem 1 (Control violation recoverability). Let J be an inductive invariant for
program (u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u))∗. Let ω ∈ [[J ]] with state µ have a monitor violation
(ω, µ) 6|= 〈u:∈ctrl(x)〉Υ+. Let µ˜ be a state recovered from monitor violation by fallback
control β, i. e., (ω, µ˜) ∈ [[β]]. Then ν ∈ [[J ]] for all states ν with (µ˜, ν) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)]].
Proof. See Appendix A.
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By Theorem 1, control violations are recoverable by replacing unsafe actions with
fallback before they take effect. Model violations, which are observed on the physical
effects, are detected at the earliest point in time, so would be recoverable in the model
if the fallback were to interfere at the start of the violation, see Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Model violation recoverability). Let J be an inductive invariant for pro-
gram α ≡ u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u). Let ω ∈ [[J ]] satisfy monitor (ω, µ) |= 〈α〉Υ+,
but (µ, ν) 6|= 〈α〉Υ+ violate it. Let µ˜ be a state recovered from monitor violation
by fallback control β from µ, i. e., (µ, µ˜) ∈ [[β]]. Then ν˜ ∈ [[J ]] for all states ν˜ with
(µ˜, ν˜) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)]].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 and 2 show how fallback control guarantees safety when monitor condi-
tions are violated at runtime. The monitor conditions in their dL representation 〈α〉Υ+
are transformed for execution into a real arithmetic representation by an offline proof
with the ModelPlex process [27], recalled in Appendix E, and further into machine code
using VeriPhy [4]. Our focus in the following sections is to advance the dL monitor
conditions and their correctness proofs to account for crucial actuator disturbance and
sensor uncertainty in partially observable systems, reusing the same synthesis process.
4 Monitors for Partial Controllability with Actuator Disturbance
Actuator disturbance results in discrepancies between the chosen control decisions u
and their physical effect u˜ (e. g., wheel slip). Def. 3 introduces a typical pattern to model
piecewise constant actuator disturbance, which chooses a nondeterministic value u˜ in
the ∆-neighborhood around the control choice u as input to the plant.
Definition 3 (Disturbance normal form). A hybrid program α in ∆-disturbance nor-
mal form has the shape u:∈ctrl(x); u˜:∈B∆(u); x′=f(x, u˜).
Actuator disturbance is partially observable by monitoring the difference between
the intended effect x′=f(x, u) and the actual effect x′=f(x, u˜) from observable quan-
tities. By partial observability, safety and invariant properties do not mention the per-
turbed actuator effect. For example, a car controller can estimate deviation from its
acceleration choice only after the fact by observing the speed difference. We therefore
adapt 〈α〉Υ+ to conjecture existence of an actuator effect u˜+ to explain all other effects
of program α collected in Υ+. Monitor condition (8) preserves safety by Theorem 3.
〈α〉∃u˜+ Υ+ (8)
Theorem 3 (Monitor with actuator disturbance preserves invariants). Let α be a
hybrid program in∆-disturbance normal form with an inductive invariant J where u˜ 6∈
FV(J). Assume the system transitions from state ω to ν, which agree on BV(α){, and
assume ω ∈ [[J ]]. If the monitor condition (8) is satisfied, i. e., (ω, ν) |= 〈α〉∃u˜+ Υ+,
then the invariant is preserved, i. e., ν ∈ [[J ]].
Proof. By logical state relation and coincidence, see Appendix A.
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x
x
x
x
t
x
(a) Safety proof: measurements xˆ are taken
near true x (bars indicate uncertainty) but sys-
tem model behavior follows true x.
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
t
x
(b) Monitor: estimates true x from sample
measurements xˆ, considering xˆ plausible if
model behavior fits to some possible true x.
Fig. 3: (a) Controllers observe true behavior through sensors. (b) Monitors have to check
existence of behavior that fits to the model and explains the measurements.
Monitoring with actuator disturbance preserves invariant conditions of a system by
Theorem 3, which, with Theorems 1+2, guarantees safety at the present moment as well
as safety of all future behavior that fits to the model.
Example 1. In the flight example, the plant follows decisions precisely without dis-
turbance. Here, we model a pilot decision wp which is subject to disturbance ∆ ≥ 0
before taking effect to analyze safety for imperfectly actuated evasion maneuvers:
α ≡ ((wp := 0; ?I) ∪ (wp := 1; ?J (wp)));w := ∗; ?(0≤w≤wp∆); plant
The true acceleration w is unobservable, so the monitor condition 〈α〉∃w+ (x+=x ∧
y+=y∧θ+=θ∧w+=w∧x+0 =x0∧y+0 =y0∧θ+0 =θ0∧w+p =wp) existentially quantifies
away the unobservable w+.
5 Monitors for Partial Observability from Sensor Uncertainty
Monitor correctness [27] requires that all bound variables of a program α be monitored,
i. e., BV(α) ⊆ FV(Υ+). This is the appropriate behavior except, of course, for variables
that are unobservable in the CPS implementation. When controllers use sensors to ob-
tain information, only the measurement is known, but not the true value that the sensor
is measuring, which would defeat the purpose. There may still be indirect implications
about unobservable quantities when they relate to observable ones, which necessitates
monitors that indirectly check the properties of the true quantity from measurements.
Unobservability results in a crucial difference between monitoring and control (and
its safety proofs). Controllers estimate true behavior by taking measurements and ob-
serving the effect of their decisions in the next measurements that are again taken from
the subsequent true values, see Fig. 3a. Monitors have to decide whether the measure-
ments explain some possible true behavior that fits to the expected model behavior, see
Fig. 3b, which results in a number of challenges that we address in this section: (i) check
existence of behavior as explanation from a set of possible true values into a set of pos-
sible next true values, (ii) link explanations to a full path through sets of possible true
values around a history of observations, and (iii) guarantee safety in both cases.
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We use y to refer to an unobservable state variable and yˆ to denote a measurement of
y with some uncertainty ∆, so yˆ∈B∆(y). We assume non-faulty sensors that function
according to specification (ω ∈ [[y∈B∆(yˆ)]] in any state ω), i. e., they always report
values that deviate from the true values by at most some known uncertainty ∆.2 Def. 4
captures what it means for states to be similar with respect to measurement uncertainty.
Definition 4 (Uncertainty similarity). We say that state ω is ∆-uncertainty-similar on
y to state ν, denoted ω≈ˆ∆y ν, iff ω = ν on {y}{ and ω(y)∈B∆(ν(yˆ)).
Def. 4 together with measurement uncertainty yˆ∈B∆(y) implies that the possible
values ω(y) are at most 2∆ from the true ν(y), so ω(y)∈B2∆(ν(y)).
In the following subsections, we characterize monitors that check whether or not
there exist states that are∆-uncertainty-similar to measured states and connected through
a program α, i. e., for measured states ω and ν do there exist uncertainty-similar states
ω˜ and ν˜ such that ω˜≈ˆ∆y ω, ν˜≈ˆ∆y ν and (ω˜, ν˜) ∈ [[α]]. The theorems will be phrased for a
single variable y and measurement yˆ, but extend to vectors of unobservable variables y
and their measurements yˆ in a straightforward way.
5.1 Model Monitors for Pairwise Consistency of Measurements
t
x True y
Measured yˆ
Fig. 4: Measurements with sensor
uncertainty. Thick blue bars: mea-
surements yˆ∈B∆(y); thin black
bars: estimated true y∈B∆(yˆ).
Monitoring based on measurements requires us to
decide whether a true value y fits to a model α
by only looking at the measurement yˆ. Intuitively,
this can be answered by finding an unobservable
prior state y∈B∆(yˆ) close to the measurement yˆ,
such that running the model α on this possible
y predicts a next unobservable y+ that is within
measurement uncertainty y+∈B∆(yˆ+) to the next
measurement yˆ+. This intuition is illustrated in
Fig. 4: a pair of two consecutive measurements is
possible if the set of possible true values of the
second measurement overlap with the values pre-
dicted by the model α from one of the possible
prior y (which is estimated from the previous measurement). Def. 5 captures this intu-
ition with a hybrid program that produces control output u from a previous measure-
ment to drive a plant x′=f(x, u)@ε for time ε to produce the next measurement.
Definition 5 (Measurement normal form). A hybrid program α in ∆-measurement
normal form has the shape u:∈ctrl(yˆ);x′=f(x, u)@ε; yˆ:∈B∆(y).
Our goal when formalizing monitoring conditions is to shift proof effort offline in
favor of fast runtime computations. Therefore we combine offline proofs with online
monitoring: (i) offline we prove that the modeled dynamics ensure that all possible
true values around the measurements satisfy the invariant (contraction, see Def. 6), and
(ii) online we monitor that some possible true values around the successive measure-
ments can be interconnected via the modeled dynamics, see monitor condition (9).
2 Sensor fusion detects sensor faults and corrects measurement outliers to satisfy this assumption.
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Definition 6 (Contraction). The [l, u]-contraction with margin [l, u], which is
∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J , ensures J for all possible values y in the [l, u]-neighborhood of the
value yˆ. A program α in ∆-measurement normal form is [l, u]-contraction-safe if
(∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J)→ [α]∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J is valid.
The [l, u]-contraction ∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J requires the controller to consider all possible
true values y around the measurement yˆ when it computes its control output u. This
makes control decisions robust to measurement uncertainty, because the control output
u is required to be chosen such that all possible values around the next measurement
again satisfy J . Geometrically, ∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J corresponds to ω(yˆ) ⊕ [l, u] ⊆ [[J ]] for
the Minkowski sum ⊕. If a controller does not account for the difference between the
true physical dynamics and the modeled dynamics, it may approach the safety bound-
ary too aggressively and potentially result in unsafe behavior. Def. 6 precisely captures
controller robustness to uncertainty and perturbation in terms of the physical effect of
its control choices, which enables monitor correctness per Theorem 4 later. Designing
a controller for the robustness criterion of Def. 6 is an important research field outside
the scope of this paper. Monitor condition (9) checks two measurements yˆ and yˆ+ ac-
cording to a model α in ∆-measurement normal form.
χm ≡ ∃y∈B∆(yˆ) 〈α〉
(∃y+ Υ+) (9)
Monitor condition (9) is satisfied if there exists a possible true value y around mea-
surement yˆ and a possible next true value y+ produced by the program α around the
next measurement. Now monitor condition (9) tells us that there exist true values close
to the measurements; in order for these true values to have the desired properties, the
program α must be [−∆,∆]-contraction-safe, see Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Pairwise measurement monitor preserves invariants). Let program α
in ∆-measurement normal form be [−∆,∆]-contraction-safe. Assume the system tran-
sitions from ω to ν, which agree on BV(α){, with non-faulty sensors. If the contraction
holds in the beginning (ω ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]]) and the pairwise measurement monitor χm
with (9) is satisfied (ω, ν) |= χm, then J is preserved, i. e., ν ∈ [[J ]].
Proof. By contraction-safety, logical state relation, and coincidence (Appendix A).
Besides safety, monitoring for existence of an unobservable value y that fits to the
present measurement yˆ also guarantees bounded variation between true values:
Proposition 1 (Bounded variation coincidence). Let α be a hybrid program in ∆-
measurement normal form. Assume the system transitions through the sequence of states
ν0, ν1, . . . νn, which agree on BV(α){, such that (νi−1, νi) |= χm with (9) for all
1≤i≤n. Then there are ωi−1≈ˆ∆y νi−1, µi≈ˆ∆y νi such that (ωi−1, µi) ∈ [[α]].
Proof. By logical state relation, see Appendix A.
The true evolution measured in νi−1 → νi → νi+1 is not necessarily a connected
path since the true values are freshly estimated from only the last measurement, which
allows jumps: the true value µi(y) of the α-run (ωi−1, µi) ∈ [[α]] might be different
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from the start ωi(y) of the next (ωi, µi+1) ∈ [[α]], but the values are reasonably close
ωi(y)∈B2∆(µi(y)) by Def. 4. Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 bound the variation in the
possible true values y of α-steps when a monitor is satisfied over measured values yˆ.
Proposition 2 (Single-step variation). Let α be a program in ∆-measurement normal
form. Let z−z0 denote the interpolated effect of x′=f(x, u)@ε inα. If (ω, ν) |= χm with
(9), then the variation distance in a single α-step is bounded: ν(y)∈B2∆(ω(y)+z−z0).
Proof. By bounded variation coincidence and uncertainty similarity (Appendix A).
Corollary 1 (Multi-step variation). Assume the model transitions through a sequence
of states ν0, ν1, . . . νn with interpolated plant effects zi−zi−1. If (νi−1, νi) |= χm with
(9) for all 1≤i≤n then variation is bounded: νn(y)∈B2∆(n+1)(ν0(y)+
∑n
i=1(zi−zi−1)).
Proof. By single-step variation of consecutive measurements, see Appendix A.
As a consequence of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, Theorem 4 is useful for single-
step consistency checks: such a monitor (i) keeps at least ∆ ≥ 0 safety margin with a
contraction-safe controller because otherwise freshly estimating true y from measure-
ments on every iteration does not preserve invariants, and (ii) detects “large” deviations
that occur in a single monitoring step. However, pairwise consistency has to be safe-
guarded for its entire 2∆(n+1) deviation over n steps to ensure safety despite gradual
drift, as illustrated in the following example, which inhibits motion and cannot exploit
improving the safety margin ∆ over a history of measurements.
Example 2. The flight protocol so far assumes perfect knowledge about the intruder’s
linear velocity vi. Here, we extend the protocol when the ownship takes measurements
vˆi of the intruder velocity vi with a sensor that might be off by uncertainty ∆.
α ≡ ((w := 0; ?∀vi∈B∆(vˆi) I)∪ (w := 1; ?∀vi∈B∆(vˆi)J (w))); plant; vˆi:∈B∆(vi)
Now the true linear intruder velocity vi is unobservable, so the monitor condition
∃vi∈B∆(vˆi) 〈α〉∃v+i (x+=x∧y+=y∧θ+=θ∧w+=w∧x+0 =x0∧y+0 =y0∧θ+0 =θ0∧
vˆi
+=vˆi) extends Υ+ with vˆi+=vˆi and existentially quantifies away both unobservable
speeds vi and v+i . Because intruder speed in the model is constant, all measurements
vˆi and vˆi+ are at most 2∆ apart. Fig. 5a illustrates the monitor behavior when mea-
suring the constant intruder speed vi = 0.5 with uncertainty ∆ = 0.1: the thick error
bars represent the range of possible measurements vˆi according to the true vi, the thin
error bars the measurement range allowed per vˆi+∈B2∆(vˆi) from the previous mea-
surement. The measurements vˆi at t = 0 to t = 5 vary around the true values as
would be expected from a sensor, which includes the worst case of two consecutive
measurements hitting opposite bounds of the uncertainty. Since the monitor does not
keep history, the true vi is allowed to drift at times t = 6 and t = 7. The monitor
detects violations if the 2∆ uncertainty is exceeded in a single step at t = 8.
Monitoring contractions and single-step conformance guarantees safety up to the
current measurement per Theorem 4 (beyond by Theorems 1+2) and detects large single-
step deviations per Proposition 1 (e. g., at t = 8 in Fig. 5a), but cannot detect gradual
drift early. In order to react to drift in measurements even before contractions are vio-
lated, we extend our monitors with state estimation over the entire measurement history.
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2 4 6 8
undetected excess drift at t=7
detected violation at t=8
t
vi
(a) Bounds from current measurement may ac-
cept excess drift
2 4 6 8
detected excess drift at t=7
detected violation at t=8
t
vi
(b) Bounds from entire measurement history
detects drift
Fig. 5: Estimating bounds from measurement pairs and measurement history
.
5.2 Model Monitors for Rolling Consistency of Measurements
Even if individual measurement pairs do not trigger the detectable single-step violation
of the previous section, the resulting aggregated drift over multiple measurements is
still detectable when we keep a history of the control choices. Instead of an explicit
list of measurement and control histories, we only represent in aggregate form what
really matters: acceptable bounds for the upcoming true values (solid blue small range
in Fig. 5b) and measurements (solid light-brown large range in Fig. 5b). The bounds are
updated on each monitor execution with the current control choice. The resulting rolling
state estimator detects gradual violation over the course of multiple measurements.
Definition 7 (Non-diverging rolling state estimator). A rolling state estimator [l, u] :=
e(yˆ0, yˆ, y − y0, ∆, [l0, u0]) updates the estimate [l, u] from the previous measurement
yˆ0, current measurement yˆ, the modeled interpolated plant effect y−y0 and the previous
estimate [l0, u0] with y0∈B[l0,u0](yˆ0) and [l0, u0] ⊆ [−∆,∆]. The estimator [l, u] :=
e(yˆ0, yˆ, y−y0, ∆, [l0, u0]) is non-diverging if u− l ≤ u0− l0 for all yˆ0, yˆ, y0, y,∆, l, u
with y∈B[l,u](yˆ) and B[l,u](yˆ) ⊆ B∆(yˆ).
The rolling state estimator updates estimates y∈B[l,u](yˆ) of true y on every mea-
surement such that the history of measurements is preserved in aggregate form. On
each step, the monitor checks for existence of a true state y in the estimate, and uses the
rolling state estimator to incorporate the current measurement yˆ into the estimate for
the next check. That way, the interpolated plant effect y−y0 is reflected in the measure-
ment bounds in the monitor condition (10) below, so does not need to be observable.
For a sequence of nmeasurements, a non-diverging rolling state estimator keeps tighter
bounds compared to the 2∆(n+1) bounds of Corollary 1 without measurement history.
Note that measurements typically vary due to sensor uncertainty, so the estimate almost
surely even improves over time by observing more measurements.
For a hybrid program α in∆-measurement normal form, the monitor condition (10)
checks the plausibility of a history of measurements by estimating the true y∈B[l,u](yˆ)
from the observations.
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χm ≡ ∃y∈B[l,u](yˆ) 〈
remember previous state︷ ︸︸ ︷
y0 := y; yˆ0 := yˆ ; α;
[l, u] := e(yˆ0, yˆ, y − y0, ∆, [l0, u0])︸ ︷︷ ︸
update estimator
〉 (∃y+ Υ+) (10)
The history of α is reflected by the rolling state estimator in its [l, u]-bounds for
upcoming measurements, which guarantees safety by Theorem 5 with Theorems 1+2.
Theorem 5 (Monitor with rolling state estimator maintains invariants). Let α be
a [l, u]-contraction safe hybrid program in ∆-measurement normal form and e be
a non-diverging estimator. Assume the system transitions from ω to ν, which agree
on BV(α){, with non-faulty sensors. If the [l, u]-contraction holds in the beginning
ω ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] and the monitor condition χm with (10) is satisfied, i. e., (ω, ν) |=
χm, then the invariant J is maintained: ν ∈ [[J ]].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Example 3. We extend the flight protocol with a velocity estimator e(vˆi0, vˆi, 0, [l0, u0])
that updates lower and upper bounds on the deviation between the next measurement
vˆi and the true velocity vi from the current measurement vˆi0 and the current estimation
bounds [l0, u0]. Since vi is constant (but not perfectly known), the interpolated plant
effect vi − vi0 is 0: l = max
(−∆, vˆi0 − vˆi + l0) u = min (∆, vˆi0 − vˆi + u0)
6 Implementation and Evaluation
Based on the monitor characterizations developed here, the process for synthesizing
model monitors from hybrid systems models is systematic and correct by construction
[27], implemented as a synthesis tactic in KeYmaera X [14] see Appendix E. A crucial
additional step in the process is to eliminate the remaining (existential) quantifiers that
describe possible unobservable true values, but the complexity and duration hinges on
the performance of external solvers. Additional arithmetical simplifications beyond [27,
Opt. 1] help overcome the limitations [7] of quantifier elimination procedures.
Quantifier Elimination Preprocessing. In order to make quantifier elimination tractable
even in complex models, we exploit two important observations about the typical shape
of input programs that is consequently reflected in the synthesized monitors: (i) con-
trollers have different control choices over multiple control branches, which result in
alternative paths through the program, reflected as disjunctions in the monitor, and
(ii) controllers do not mention unobservable variables (only the measured quantities),
hence unobservable variables occur only in few subformulas of a monitor. We rewrite
monitor conditions into disjunctive normal form by proof to split a single quantifier
elimination proof obligation into several smaller ones with the lemmas (11) and (12)
corresponding to these observations. These preprocessing steps in the tactic before
quantifier elimination help scale the synthesis tactic to larger models, as discussed next.
∃x (p(x) ∨ q(x))↔ ∃x p(x) ∨ ∃x q(x) (11)
∃x (p() ∧ q(x))↔ p() ∧ ∃x q(x) (12)
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Table 2: Monitor synthesis case studies
Monitor Size Synthesis Duration [s] Simulation
Case Study Dim. ∀∃ ∀∃-free ProofSteps
Proof
Check
Disco-
very QE Ext. P R
Horizontal
flight
original 8 – 46 6259 33 4 – 1 1 1
+ actuator 9 124 43 10369 33 6 3 4 1 1
+ sensor 9 102 169 11804 12 8 2 3 1 0.81a
Water
tank [27]
original 3 – 19 676 2 1 – 0 1 1
+ actuator 4 25 30 1864 2 2 1 1 1 1
+ sensor 4 35 100 1383 2 2 0 0 0.94 0.93
Train
control [33]
original 8 – 74 1309 6 3 – 0 1 1
+ actuator 10 148 109 3703 8 6 1 2 1 1
+ sensor 10 137 206 3051 6 5 0 0 1 0.98
Road traffic
control [26]
original 9 – 197 11692 146 17 – 104
Not
simulated
+ actuator 11 218 803 12551 193 16 0 179
+ sensor 11 208 877 22384 83 25 0 69
Robot colli-
sion avoid-
ance [25]
original – 231 26405 332 61 – 16
Not
simulated
+ actuator 15 535 275 4786 668 95 36b 38
+ sensor 15 513 10980c 152810 675 89 1142b 1145
a 5 runs with 15 loop iterations b with preprocessing (11) and (12) c simplification aborted
(2min timeout)
Synthesis Performance. We ran the synthesis tactic on the running example and dL
case studies, a water tank [27], train control [33], road traffic control [26], and robot
collision avoidance [25]. The steps of the synthesis process, its duration, and the size
of the resulting monitor condition in terms of operators are summarized in Table 2. The
duration measurements were taken on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core i7 with 16GB of memory.
For each case study, we synthesized monitors for the original model and analyzed
extended models that include sensor uncertainty and actuator disturbance. The column
“Dim.” gives an intuition on the complexity of the case study in terms of the number
of model variables. We list the monitor size in terms of the number of arithmetical,
comparison, and logical operators in the intermediate quantified form (column “∀∃”)
and the final quantifier-free fully simplified form (column “∀∃-free”), as well as the
duration of the synthesis steps: column “Proof Check” lists the duration of checking
the safety proof, column “Discovery” lists the duration of discovering the intermediate
quantified monitor form, and column “QE” the duration of obtaining the quantifier-free
form. Finally, column “Ext.” lists how much of the total synthesis duration (Proof Check
+ Discovery + QE) is spent in external solvers. The main insight is that the synthesis
and discovery of monitor conditions with the techniques in this paper processes CPS
models with modest computation and time resources.
Monitor Performance. We ran simulations based on hybrid program image computa-
tions [32] with randomly injected actuator disturbance recorded as ground truth, and
measured the monitoring outcome in terms of precision ( true non-alarmsall non-alarms , column “P”) and
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recall ( true non-alarmstrue non-alarms+false alarms , column “R”), see Table 2. Simulation runs executed 50
loop iterations, and the measurements were averaged over 100 runs. As expected, all
simulation steps in lines “original” and “actuator” with full observability (i. e., sensors
work perfectly) are correctly classified by the monitors. Simulation steps in lines “sen-
sor” randomly chose sensor uncertainty i.i.d. on each step.
7 Related Work
Runtime verification and monitoring for finite state discrete systems has received sig-
nificant attention (e. g., [6,17,24]). Some approaches monitor continuous-time signals
(e. g., [12,28]). We focus on hybrid systems models of CPS to combine both, and our
methods are robust to the crucial effects of sensor uncertainty and actuator disturbance.
Several tools for formal verification of hybrid systems are actively developed (e. g.,
SpaceEx [13], dReach [20], and extended NuSMV/MathSat [5]). Provably correct mon-
itor synthesis, however, crucially relies on the rewriting capabilities and flexibility of
combining [·] and 〈·〉 modalities in dL [31,30] and KeYmaera X [14].
Combined Offline and Runtime Verification. In [8,9], offline model checking is com-
bined with runtime monitoring for robot path planning. For offline verification, the
methods assume that motion of the robot stays inside a tube around the planned path;
staying inside the tube is monitored at runtime and enforced with fallback control syn-
thesized using the techniques in [18]. The approach uses STL to model motion prim-
itives for runtime monitoring and learns parameters from example trajectories. We, in
contrast, use hybrid systems models including sensor uncertainty and actuator perturba-
tion and check physical model compliance instead of assuming it when characterizing
monitor conditions and fallback requirements with provable safety guarantees.
Reachset conformance testing [35] computes reachable sets of hybrid automata at
runtime to to falsify simulations or recorded data. The crucial benefit of our methods is
to perform expensive computations offline (provably correct fast reachable set computa-
tion online in realtime is hard) and provably guarantee safety from offline proofs when
the monitor conditions are satisfied at runtime of the monitored system from sensor
measurements and control decisions that are subject to actuator disturbance.
Monitoring and Sandboxing. Owing to their practical significance, numerous moni-
toring and sandboxing techniques have been proposed for CPSs [23,21,3,19,36,11,10].
Because these approaches, with the notable exception of ModelPlex [27] that this work
is based on, do not ship their monitors with correctness proofs, they may not check all
conditions that are needed to discover all model violations and so no guarantee can be
given that they always reliably engage fallback mitigation when necessary.
Specification mining techniques for LTL can be adapted to monitor for safety vio-
lations [23] and intervene, assuming that the next environment input is available to the
monitor. In CPSs, this is feasible only when the next input can be prevented from be-
coming actuated, see Theorem 1 and, as presented in this paper, with means to detect
gradual deviation from the model that accumulates to violation over time.
Shields [21] and robust reactive system synthesis [3] are approaches to detect and
correct erroneous control output in discrete models, which however ignore the continu-
ous behavior that is crucial in CPS and explicit in our differential equations. Monitoring
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based on discrete models is useful for high-level planning tasks (e. g., waypoint plan-
ning), but gives no guarantees about the resulting continuous physical motion and is
unable to detect effects related to disturbance or sensing, such as gradual sensor drift.
Languages for modeling runtime monitors based on sensor events [19] are purely
discrete (e.g., speed lower than threshold), come without correctness guarantees on the
mapping between monitor and inputs/outputs and without correctness guarantees on
the safety properties and alarms. In contrast, our methods provably guarantee that sat-
isfied monitors at runtime imply system safety (and in particular safety of the resulting
physical effects) by relating the observed dynamics to the safe models verified offline.
Robustness estimation methods [36,11,10] measure the degree to which a moni-
tor given as a signal/metric temporal logic specification is satisfied in order to allow
bounded perturbation akin to our actuator disturbance, but cannot detect gradual drift
in sensor measurements. The methods assume a finite time horizon, compact inputs and
outputs, and restrictions on the dynamics (e. g., piecewise constant between sampling
points [10]), but do not support the predictive model of continuous dynamics and sen-
sors/actuators that is needed for system safety at runtime, which we handle explicitly.
Summary. In summary, our approach improves over existing runtime monitoring tech-
niques with provably correct monitor conditions, explicit dynamics with sensor uncer-
tainty and actuator disturbance, and shifts expensive computation offline:
– Other methods [23,21,19,36,11,10,3] start from discrete specifications and leave the
continuous dynamics implicit and unchecked. We, in contrast, start from hybrid sys-
tems models with continuous dynamics and therefore characterize monitors prov-
ably correct with respect to the dynamics model. Additionally, unlike [8,9,35,27],
we model hybrid systems with sensors and actuators and therefore: (i) detect when
uncertainty accumulates to unsafe deviations, and (ii) can distinguish between vi-
olations caused by uncertainty in our own system (sensors, actuators) vs. unsafe
environments, which makes our approach better suited to dynamic environments.
– Methods that include discrete models (e. g., [19,22,1,23,8,21,11,10,3]) would re-
quire additional assumptions on the continuous dynamics between sampling points
in order to be sound [32], which we handle explicitly like ModelPlex [27], but char-
acterize partial controllability and partial observability and distinguish between de-
viation caused by mere uncertainty vs. actually unsafe environment behavior.
– Some methods [35] rely on extensive runtime computations (e. g., reachable sets,
whose runtime is hard to predict). We, in contrast, perform expensive computations
offline. At runtime, we only evaluate the resulting formula in real arithmetic for
concrete sensor values and control decisions, which enables fast enough responses.
Crucially, we prove correctness properties that correctly link satisfied monitors to
offline safety proofs, result in monitors that warn ahead of time, and account for partial
controllability and partial observability so that the monitored system inherits the prov-
able safety guarantees about the model despite the inevitable presence of uncertainty.
8 Conclusion
Provable guarantees about the safety of cyber-physical systems at runtime are crucial
as systems become increasingly autonomous. Formal verification techniques provide
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an important basis by proving safety of CPS models, which then requires transferring
the guarantees of offline proofs to system execution. We answer the key question of
how offline proofs transfer by runtime monitoring, and, crucially, what property needs
to be runtime-monitored from sensor measurements to provably imply safety of the
monitored system. Our techniques significantly extend previous methods to models of
practical interest by characterizing monitors in differential dynamic logic and imple-
menting proof tactics that correctly synthesize monitor conditions that are robust to
bounded sensor uncertainty and bounded actuator disturbance, which are the two most
fundamental sources of partial observability in CPS.
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A Proofs
This section lists all proofs for the theorems, propositions, and corollaries of this paper.
These proofs use the following characteristics of hybrid programs and dL formu-
las: (i) The truth of a formula φ only depends on its free variables FV(φ); (ii) Hybrid
programs only change their bound variables BV(α) but not the complement BV(α){;
(iii) Similar states (that agree on the free variables) have similar transitions according
to the transition relation [[·]] of hybrid programs. We use V(α) = FV(α) ∪ BV(α) to
denote the set of all variables of α. Specifically, our proofs use the following versions
of [30, Lemmas 9, 11, 12 with 17]. Hybrid programs only change their bound variables
BV(α) but not any other BV(α){:
Lemma 1 (Bound effect lemma [30]). If (ω, ν) ∈ [[α]], then ω = ν on BV(α){.
The truth of a formula φ only depends on its free variables FV(φ):
Lemma 2 (Coincidence lemma [30]). If ω = ω˜ on FV(φ) then ω ∈ [[φ]] iff ω˜ ∈ [[φ]].
Similar states (that agree on the free variables) have similar transitions according to the
transition relation of hybrid programs:
Lemma 3 (Coincidence lemma [30]). If ω = ω˜ on V ⊇ FV(α) and (ω, ν) ∈ [[α]], then
there is a ν˜ such that (ω˜, ν˜) ∈ [[α]] and ν = ν˜ on V .
Logical state relation 〈α〉Υ+ from [27, Def. 3] captures runs of hybrid programs α [27].
Lemma 4 (Logical state relation [27]). Let V be the set of all variables. Two states
ω, ν that agree on V \ BV(α), i. e., ω(z) = ν(z) for all z ∈ V \ BV(α), satisfy
(ω, ν) ∈ [[α]] iff (ω, ν) |= 〈α〉Υ+.
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Proof of Theorem 1. From (ω, µ˜) ∈ [[β]] and so (ω, µ˜) |= 〈u:∈ctrl(x)〉Υ+ by assump-
tion, we get (ω, µ˜) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x)]] by [27, Thm. 2]. Now (ω, µ˜) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x)]] and in
turn (ω, ν) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u)]] from the semantics of sequential composition
with assumption (µ˜, ν) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)]]. Hence we conclude ν ∈ [[J ]] by assumption
J → [u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u)]J with assumption ω ∈ [[J ]].
Proof of Theorem 2. From [27, Thm. 1] with (ω, µ) |= 〈α〉Υ+ we get µ ∈ [[J ]] as
ω ∈ [[J ]]. Now (µ, µ˜) ∈ [[β]] by assumption and so (µ, µ˜) |= 〈u:∈ctrl(x)〉Υ+ by Def. 2.
Hence we get (µ, µ˜) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x)]] by [27, Thm. 2] and in turn
(µ, ν˜) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u)]] by the semantics of sequential composition with as-
sumption (µ˜, ν˜) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)]]. Now (µ, ν˜) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u)]] and so we con-
clude ν˜ ∈ [[J ]] from assumption J → [u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u)]J with µ ∈ [[J ]].
Proof of Theorem 3. The monitor condition (ω, ν) |= 〈α〉∃u˜+ Υ+ is satisfied by as-
sumption, so we get (ω, ν) |= ∃x˜+〈α〉Υ+ by Barcan [30] with x˜+ 6∈ V(α). Hence,
there exists a state νrx˜ with r ∈ R for x˜ such that (ω, νrx˜) |= 〈α〉Υ+ and so (ω, νrx˜) ∈ [[α]]
by Lemma 4. Now ω ∈ [[J ]] and |= J → [α]J by assumption and therefore ω ∈ [[[α]J ]]
and in turn νrx˜ ∈ [[J ]] by (ω, νrx˜) ∈ [[α]]. Since ν = νrx˜ on {x˜}{ we conclude ν ∈ [[J ]] by
Lemma 2 with x˜ 6∈ FV(J).
Proof of Theorem 4. The model monitor is satisfied (ω, ν) |= ∃y∈B∆(yˆ) 〈α〉 (∃y+ Υ+)
by assumption, so from y+ 6∈ V(α) we get (ω, ν) |= ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)∃y+ 〈α〉Υ+ by Bar-
can [30]. Hence there exist r ∈ R for y and s ∈ R for y+ as well as states ωry and
νsy with ω
r
y ∈ [[y∈B∆(yˆ)]] and (ωry, νsy) |= 〈α〉Υ+ and so (ωry, νsy) ∈ [[α]] by Lemma 4.
We get ωry ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]] from ω ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]] by ωry = ω on {y}{ and y 6∈
FV(∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J) with Lemma 2. Since program α is [−∆,∆]-contraction-safe by as-
sumption, we now know ωry ∈ [[[α]∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]] by Def. 6 using ωry ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]].
Hence νsy ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]] by (ωry, νsy) ∈ [[α]]. Since ν = νsy on {y}{ we get
ν ∈ [[∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J ]] by Lemma 2 since y 6∈ FV(∀y∈B∆(yˆ)J). Therefore from
ν ∈ [[y∈B∆(yˆ)]] by assumption we conclude ν ∈ [[J ]].
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows the sketch below. Note that the true evolution
measured in νi−1 → νi → νi+1 is not necessarily a connected path since the measure-
ments allow jumps: the endpoint µi of the α-run (ωi−1, µi) ∈ [[α]] might be different
from the start of the next (ωi, µi+1) ∈ [[α]].
ω0 µ1 ω2 µ3
ν0 ν1 ν2 ν3 νn−1 νn
ω1 µ2 ωn−1 µn
. . . . . .
±∆ ±∆
±∆
±∆
±∆
±∆
±∆ ±∆
α
α
α
α
From (νi−1, νi) |= χm, i. e., (νi−1, νi) |= ∃y∈B∆(yˆ) 〈α〉 (∃y+ Υ+)we get (νi−1, νi) |=
∃y∈B∆(yˆ)∃y+ 〈α〉Υ+ by Barcan [30] with y+ 6∈ V(α). Hence there exist ωi−1≈ˆ∆y νi−1
and µi≈ˆ∆y νi with (ωi−1, µi) |= 〈α〉Υ+ and we conclude (ωi−1, µi) ∈ [[α]] by Lemma 4.
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Proof of Proposition 4. From (ω, ν) |= χm and non-faulty measurement we know there
exist ω˜≈ˆ∆y ω and ν˜≈ˆ∆y ν with (ω˜, ν˜) ∈ [[α]] by Proposition 1 and so there are interme-
diate states µ and µ˜ such that (ω˜, µ) ∈ [[u:∈ctrl(yˆ)]], (µ, µ˜) ∈ [[x′=f(x, u)@ε]], and
(µ˜, ν˜) ∈ [[yˆ:∈B∆(y)]]. Thus, the interpolated effect z − z0 of x′=f(x, u)@ε is µ˜(y) −
µ(y). Since y 6∈ BV(u:∈ctrl(yˆ)) and y 6∈ BV(yˆ:∈B∆(y)) we get µ(y) = ω˜(y) and
ν˜(y) = µ˜(y). Hence, ν˜(y) = ω˜(y)+ z− z0 and in turn ν˜(y)∈B∆(ω(y)+ z− z0) from
ω˜≈ˆ∆y ω. We conclude ν(y)∈B2∆(ω(y) + z − z0) from ν˜≈ˆ∆y ν.
Proof of Corollary 4. Follows from 2∆ variation of consecutive measurements, i. e.,
yˆ+∈B2∆(yˆ) and the additional sensor uncertainty yi∈B∆(yˆi) that is relevant at the
beginning and end of the sequence of states but not at intermediate steps since overlap-
ping.
Proof of Theorem 5. For a hybrid program α in ∆-measurement normal form, let β ab-
breviate the program y0 := y; yˆ0 := yˆ; α; [l, u] := e(yˆ0, yˆ, y − y0, ∆, [l0, u0]). The
monitor condition χm is satisfied (ω, ν) |= ∃y∈B[l,u](yˆ) 〈β〉 (∃y+ Υ+) by assump-
tion, so we get (ω, ν) |= ∃y∈B[l,u](yˆ)∃y+ 〈β〉Υ+ by Barcan [30] with y+ 6∈ V(β).
Hence there exist r ∈ R for y and s ∈ R for y+ as well as states ωry and νsy with
ωry ∈ [[y∈B[l,u](yˆ)]] and (ωry, νsy) |= 〈α〉Υ+ and so (ωry, νsy) ∈ [[β]] by Lemma 4. We
get ωry ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] from assumption ω ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] by Lemma 2 since
ωry = ω on {y}{ and y 6∈ FV(∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J). Program α is [l, u]-contraction-safe by
assumption and therefore by Def. 6 using ωry ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] we get
ωry ∈ [[[y0 := y; yˆ0 := yˆ;u:∈ctrl(yˆ);x′=f(x, u)@ε; yˆ:∈B∆(y)]∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] .
Now µ ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] for all reachable states µ such that
(ωry, µ) ∈ [[y0 := y; yˆ0 := yˆ;u:∈ctrl(yˆ);x′=f(x, u)@ε; yˆ:∈B∆(y)]] .
In particular, since the monitor condition is satisfied there exists a state µ such that also
(µ, νsy) ∈ [[[l, u] := e(yˆ0, yˆ, y − y0, ∆, [l0, u0])]]. The estimator [l, u] := e(yˆ0, yˆ, y −
y0, ∆, [l0, u0]) is non-diverging (Def. 7) by assumption, so we get νsy ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]]
and in turn also ν ∈ [[∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J ]] by Lemma 2 with ν = νsy on {y}{ and y 6∈
FV(∀y∈B[l,u](yˆ)J). Hence, from ν ∈ [[y∈B[l,u](yˆ)]] by assumption we conclude ν ∈ [[J ]].
B Derive Monitor Condition in Arithmetical Form
This section gives a simple example illustrating how an (executable) arithmetical for-
mula can be obtained from a monitor characterization [27].
The monitor condition 〈a := a+ 1∪b := ∗; ?b ≤ 3〉(a+ = a∧b+ = b) for program
a := a+ 1 ∪ b := ∗; ?b ≤ 3 is turned into arithmetical form with a dL proof [30].
` (a+ = a+ 1 ∧ b+ = b) ∨ (a+ = a ∧ b+ ≤ 3)
∃R ` (a+ = a+ 1 ∧ b+ = b) ∨ ∃b≤3 (a+ = a ∧ b+ = b)
〈:∗〉,〈?〉 ` (a+ = a+ 1 ∧ b+ = b) ∨ 〈b := ∗; ?b ≤ 3〉(a+ = a ∧ b+ = b)
〈:=〉 ` 〈a := a+ 1〉(a+ = a ∧ b+ = b) ∨ 〈b := ∗; ?b ≤ 3〉(a+ = a ∧ b+ = b)
〈∪〉 ` 〈a := a+ 1 ∪ b := ∗; ?b ≤ 3〉(a+ = a ∧ b+ = b)
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The resulting monitor formula a+ = a+1∧b+ = b∨a+ = a∧b+ ≤ 3 of the sequent
proof means that either the output a+ is the input a incremented by 1 while b stayed
unchanged, or that the output b+ ≤ 3 while a stayed unchanged. The monitor formula
is satisfied over states ω and ν with ω(a) = 2, ω(b) = 3 and ν(a) = 3, ν(b) = 3, i. e.
(ω, ν) |= a+ = a+1∧b+ = b∨a+ = a∧b+ ≤ 3; it is violated on ν(a) = 2, ν(b) = 4.
C Measurement Modeling Patterns
In safety proofs, a useful modeling pattern for representing measurements takes mea-
surements before the controller yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u), e. g., as used for
modeling speed and position sensors of ground robots in [25]. That way, the loop in-
variants J in a safety proof are less cluttered with information about the measurements,
which are of temporary nature for making a control decision. For the purpose of de-
riving monitoring conditions as introduced in Section 5, however, it is beneficial to
have access to a pair of measurements in the loop body, so the program shape be-
comes u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ:∈B∆(y). In order to avoid duplicate safety analyses,
Lemma 5 provides a way of transferring invariant properties between these two shapes.
Lemma 5 (Measurement rollover). Assume formula
A→ [(yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u))∗]S
is proven with invariant J , i. e., A → J , J → [yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J ,
and J → S are valid. The measurement yˆ is bound only in yˆ:∈B∆(y) but nowhere
else and assume yˆ 6∈ FV(J). Then, measurement after x′=f(x, u) is equivalent to
measurement before u:∈ctrl(yˆ):
J → [(yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
≡ J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [(u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ:∈B∆(y))]J︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
Proof. The proof uses the axioms [:∗] ([x := ∗]P ↔ ∀xP ) and [?] ([?Q]P ↔ (P →
Q)) [30] together with propositional reasoning and bound renaming to split off and
introduce measurements:
→ First, the test [?] and random assignment [:∗] split off the measurement after plant
x′=f(x, u), then [?] and [:∗] are applied in the inverse direction to introduce the
measurement before u:∈ctrl(yˆ):
∗
id F ` J → [yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J
[?],[:∗],[;],WL F ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J
∀xP ↔ P (x6∈P )F ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)](∀yˆ∈B∆(y) J)
[;],[:∗],[?] F ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ:∈B∆(y)]J
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← The converse direction introduces an exact measurement yˆ+ := y with a fresh ghost
variable yˆ+ first and then introduces measurement error using [: ∗]→ [:=], which
is defined as [yˆ := ∗; ?y −∆ ≤ yˆ ≤ y +∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
yˆ:∈B∆(y)
]P → [yˆ := y]P :
∗
id G ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ:∈B∆(y)]J
BR G ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ:∈B∆(y)]J
[: ∗]→ [:=]G ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u); yˆ+ := y]J
[:=] ghost,[;]G ` J ∧ yˆ∈B∆(y)→ [u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J
[:∗],∀R,[?] G ` J → [yˆ:∈B∆(y); u:∈ctrl(yˆ); x′=f(x, u)]J
Lemma 5 allows us to switch between the measurement modeling patterns for safety
proofs and model monitors.
D Proof-Guided Model Monitors for Nonlinear Dynamics
Existing techniques for model monitor synthesis [27] require symbolic closed-form
polynomial solutions to characterize differential equations. Hybrid systems with non-
linear dynamics, however, do not necessarily have symbolic closed-form solutions, or
their solutions are not expressible in first-order real arithmetic. In such cases, hybrid
systems safety proofs employ a more general technique based on invariant properties
of differential equations [34] to abstract away the concrete trajectories of nonlinear
differential equations by describing invariant regions that confine the trajectories. The
challenge with such overapproximations is that they are not enough to conclude the
existence of a model run as required for correct monitor synthesis [27].
The crucial insight that we gain from a successful safety proof for monitoring and
model validation is that the potentially complicated exact behavior is not relevant in
detail for safety, but that it was enough to stay inside a safety-relevant region. We exploit
this observation to synthesize monitoring conditions that only check these safety-critical
invariant regions and thereby allow for a wider safe variety of actual system behavior
instead of insisting on the specific modeled behavior.
In this section, we discuss techniques to translate models to make sure that their dif-
ferential invariants are expressed explicitly and their specific dynamics are abstracted to
any behavior inside the invariant regions. That way, the invariant conditions are picked
up during monitor synthesis in a provably correct way and become represented in the
monitoring conditions that are derived from these models. As a main insight, we exploit
the fact that the desired monitoring conditions must concisely capture paths to safety vi-
olation. Specifically, a model monitor for a model α of the form ctrl; plant uses a model
α˜ that overapproximates the plant x′=f(x, u) & Q with nondeterministic assignments
x := ∗. These assignments are guarded by the evolution domain Q and differential in-
variants R(x, x0) before and after the nondeterministic assignments to conservatively
preserve the semantics of evolution domain constraints in differential equations, so α˜
has the shape x0 := x; ?Q;x := ∗; ?(Q ∧R(x, x0).
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Theorem 6 guarantees that a satisfied monitor for program α˜ preserves an inductive
safety property for one control step, so can be extended to loops in a straightforward
way as in [27]. For simplicity, we assume that the world outside α˜ is unmodified on
BV(α˜){, which can be lifted easily with techniques in [27].
Theorem 6 (Nonlinear model monitor correctness). Let α be a hybrid program of the
form u:∈ctrl(x);x′=f(x, u) with evolution domain constraint Q. Let α∗ be provably
safe with invariant J , so A → [α∗]S, A → J , J → [α]J , and J → S are valid.
Let x = BV(x′=f(x, u)) and let x0 be fresh variables not in V(α). Let the differential
invariants R(x, x0) be provable, so J → [u:∈ctrl(x);x0 := x;x′=f(x, u)]R(x, x0) is
valid. Assume the system transitions from state ω to state ν, which agree on BV(α){,
and assume ω |= J . If the nonlinear model monitor
χm˜ ≡ 〈
(
u:∈ctrl(x);x0 := x; ?Q;x := ∗; ?(Q ∧R(x, x0)
)∗〉Υ+
is satisfied, i. e., (ω, ν) |= χm˜, then the invariant J is preserved, i. e., ν ∈ [[J ]].
Proof. Follows from [27, Theorem 1] by reducing the complicated dynamics J →
[(u:∈ctrl(x); {x′ = θ & Q})]J to the safety proof of the nondeterministic approxima-
tion, i. e., formula (13) is valid.(
J → [u:∈ctrl(x);x0 := x; ?Q;x := ∗; ?Q ∧R(x, x0)]J︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)
→
(
J → [u:∈ctrl(x); {x′ = θ & Q}]J
) (13)
∗
id C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q;x := ∗; ?Q ∧R(x, x0)]J
[:∗],[;] C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q]∀x[?Q ∧R(x, x0)]J
GVR C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q][x′=f(x, u) & Q ∧R(x, x0)][?Q ∧R(x, x0)]J
[;] C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q; x′=f(x, u) & Q ∧R(x, x0)][?Q ∧R(x, x0)]J
DW,[?] C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q; x′=f(x, u) & Q ∧R(x, x0)]J .
dC C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; ?Q; x′=f(x, u) & Q]J
[?Q] C ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x0 := x; x′=f(x, u) & Q]J
[:=] ghostC ` J → [u:∈ctrl(x); x′=f(x, u) & Q]J
We use [:=] ghost to introduce assignments to fresh variables x0 that store the state
of x before the plant, so that it is available when describing the differential equation with
the differential invariant R(x, x0) in step dC. The side condition closes by assumption
J → [u:∈ctrl(x);x0 := x;x′=f(x, u)]R(x, x0). Differential invariants hold through-
out the entire evolution of a differential equation, from beginning to end: step DW, [?]
makes it available after the differential equation, step [?Q] at the beginning using the
axiom [?q(x)][{x′ = f(x)&q(x)}]p(x) ↔ [{x′ = f(x)&q(x)}]p(x) derived from DI
[30]. Now that the differential equation is safeguarded by its differential invariants, in
step GVR and [:∗] we abstract from the concrete dynamics by allowing any evolution
that satisfies the differential invariants.
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Example 4 (Model monitor). The flight protocol with a nondeterministic plant turns
into the following monitor condition, where Υ+ is
∧
z∈{x,y,θ,wx0,y0,θ0} z
+=z:
〈
ctrl; (x0 := x; y0 := y; θ0 := θ; ?>;x := ∗; y := ∗; θ := ∗;
?(w=0→ S = S(0)) ∧ (w=1→ T = T (0))Υ+
with
I ≡ vi sin θx− (vi cos θ − vo)y︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
> vo + vi and
J () ≡ viw sin θx− viw cos θy + vovi cos θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
> vovi + viw
The synthesis steps in Section 6 (Fig. 6) produce this arithmetical monitor condition:
I ∧ θ+=θ∧ sin θ+x+− (cos θ+− 1)y+ = sin θx− (cos θ− 1)y∧w+=0∧w+i =0
∨J (w+)∧sin θ+x+−cos θ+y++cos θ+ = sin θx−cos θy+cos θ∧w+=1∧w+i =0
The model monitors derived by abstracting from the specific continuous dynamics
to the invariant regions identified in the safety proof allow monitoring of models without
symbolic closed-form solution. The invariant regions allow for some deviation from the
specific modeled dynamics, but still assume that control choices are perfectly turned
into physical effects and that the real world is perfectly observable. The techniques in
the main part of this paper present two fundamental extensions with different flavors
of uncertainty: actuator disturbance due to partial controllability and sensor uncertainty
due to partial observability.
E Implementation
The process for synthesizing monitors from hybrid systems models with actuator distur-
bance and sensor uncertainty is illustrated in Fig. 6, with original model α and overap-
proximated model α˜. The process is implemented as a tactic in KeYmaera X [14]. The
bottom step in Fig. 6 uses dL automation and quantifier elimination (QE) to synthesize
an easily executable quantifier-free arithmetical model monitoring condition F (x, x+)
as illustrated in the following sequent proof. The steps are a straightforward application
of dL axioms from the innermost formula going outwards. The existential quantifier can
be instantiated by applying [27, Opt. 1], since Υ+ ≡ x+=x. Any remaining quantified
sub-formulas are turned into their equivalent quantifier-free form using preprocessing
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Safety A→ [α∗]S
Safety
by Theorem 6 ⇑
A→ [α˜∗]S
Semantical
by [27, Theorem 1] ⇑
(ω, ν) ∈ [[α˜∗]]
Logical
by [27, Lemma 4] m
(ω, ν) |= 〈α˜∗〉Υ+
Logical
by [27, Lemma 5] ⇑
(ω, ν) |= 〈α˜〉Υ+
Logical
by Theorem 4 ⇑
(ω, ν) |= ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈α˜〉(∃y+, Υ+)
Arithmetical
by dL proof ⇑
(ω, ν) |= F (x, x+) by online monitoring
Fig. 6: Proof-guided model transformation for synthesizing a monitor for nonlinear dif-
ferential equations with sensor uncertainty by monitoring for pairwise existence of un-
observable true values y, y+. Synthesis correct by a chain of semantical representation,
logic characterization, and arithmetical form of a monitor.
by lemmas (11) and (12) with external solvers for QE, which are connected to KeY-
maera X (e. g., Mathematica).
` F (x \ y, x+ \ y+)
R ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)
(
Q(u) ∧Q(x+) ∧R(x+, u) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)
)
∃R ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)
(
Q(u) ∧ ∃x (Q ∧R(x, u) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)))
〈:=〉 ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈x0 := u〉
(
Q(u) ∧ ∃x (Q ∧R(x, x0) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)))
` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈u:∈ctrl(yˆ)〉〈x0 := x〉
(
Q ∧ ∃x (Q ∧R(x, x0) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)))
〈?〉 ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈u:∈ctrl(yˆ)〉〈x0 := x〉〈?Q〉∃x
(
Q ∧R(x, x0) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)
)
〈:∗〉 ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈u:∈ctrl(yˆ)〉〈x0 := x〉〈?Q〉〈x := ∗〉
(
Q ∧R(x, x0) ∧ (∃y+ Υ+)
)
〈?〉 ` ∃y∈B∆(yˆ)〈u:∈ctrl(yˆ)〉〈x0 := x〉〈?Q〉〈x := ∗〉〈?Q ∧R(x, x0)〉(∃y+ Υ+)
KeYmaera X applies time-bounded heuristics to reduce formula size before calling
external solvers, since the performance of external solvers in this final step depends on
the number of variables and quantifier alternations in the monitor condition. As a result,
the proof step numbers reported here may slightly differ when rerunning the synthesis
on other platforms.
